nixontapes.org - Nixon Tapes and Transcripts August 21, 2013 Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum Completes "First Pass" Through Nixon Tapes 339 Hours of Tapes Released; 3,000 Hours Released to Date First Pass Began in 1997; Review of Final 700 Hours Remains Nixon on China: "The ablest people in the world in my opinion—potentially. We've got to get along with them. It's no problem for the next 5 years, the next 20 years, but it's the critical problem of our age." Nixon to Brezhnev: "We head the two most powerful nations...it is essential that those two nations, where possible, work together...If we decide to work together, we can change the world." * * * Press Coverage of This Release: James Rosen, Fox News' "The Foxhole" Peter Baker, The New York Times Neil King, The Wall Street Journal Christopher Goffard, The Los Angeles Times * * * by Luke A. Nichter, co-author of upcoming book The Nixon Tapes (with Douglas Brinkley) On August 21, 2013, the Nixon Presidential Library released approximately 339 hours of Nixon tapes originally recorded between April and July 1973, when taping was discontinued. With this release, approximately 3,000 hours of tapes have been declassified and released to the public out of a total of approximately 3,700 hours recorded by the Nixon White House taping system. This release was a final sequel to the tape releases that occurred on July 11, 2007, December 2, 2008, June 23, 2009, and December 9, 2010. With this release, the first pass through the Nixon tapes is now complete. The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) began preparing the 3,700 hours of Nixon tapes for chronological release in the mid-1990s, following the death of President Nixon in 1994. NARA will next begin a review of the final 700 hours, in the hopes that recordings restricted in one of the earlier releases are now releasable under a more liberal deed negotiated when the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda came under federal control during 2007. Tapes once restricted for reasons such as national security or privacy of a living person may no longer need to remain restricted. NARA has not set a timetable for this second release. The period in the Nixon administration covered by these "Chron 5.5" tapes was tulmultuous, to say the least: April 30: President Nixon accepted the resignations of his two closest aides, H.R. "Bob" Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman. Counsel to the President John W. Dean, III and Attorney General Richard Kleindienst also left the adminstration that day. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. became White House Chief of Staff, and Elliot Richardson was nominated to be Attorney General. The resignations forced Nixon to make a public statement in which he took the blame for Watergate. May 1: The U.S. Senate passed a resolution establishing a Watergate Special Prosecutor. May 14: John W. Dean, III turned over highly sensitive records to U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Chief Judge John J. Sirica, including the Huston Plan, a blueprint for domestic surveillance. May 17: The Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, aka Ervin Committee or simply the Senate Watergate Committee, sat for the first time. Its chair was Senator Sam J. Ervin (D-NC), accompanied by Chief Counsel Sam Dash. Senator. The Ranking Member was Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-TN), accompanied by Counsel Fred Thompson. May 19: Former Kennedy administration Solicitor General Archibald Cox was appointed Watergate Special Prosecutor. May 22: President Nixon issued a statement regarding the Watergate break-in and subsequent "cover-up." June 25: Former White House Counsel John W. Dean, III began testimony before the Ervin Committee that was the first to directly implicate White House officials, including former Attorney General John Mitchell and President Nixon. July 7: President Nixon issued a letter in response to an Ervin Committee request for testimony and records of White House officials. July 12: White House Chief of Staff Alexander M. Haig turned off the Nixon taping system. July 13: Former Deputy Assistant to the President Alexander P. Butterfield testified in executive session before the Ervin Committee and revealed the existence of the secret Nixon taping system. Butterfield was one of only a handful of people who knew taping took place from February 1971 to July 1973. The Ervin Committee immediately began the process of requesting tapes as evidence. The period coverered by this "Chron 5.5" tapes release also included a number of non-Watergate related historic events: May 1-2: West German Chancellor Willy Brandt made an official visit to Washington. May 24: President Nixon hosted a reception and dinner for returned Prisoners of War, which remains the largest event ever held at the White House. The dinner was recently commemorated at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library by POWs who attended the original dinner 40 years ago. May 29-31: President Nixon and French President Georges Pompidou held a summit at Reykjavik, Iceland. June 18-25: Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev made an official visit to the United States, following Nixon's visit to Moscow during May 1972. July 1: The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began operation, beginning America's "War on Drugs." July 9: Clarence Kelley was sworn in as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. nixontapes.org has obtained a copy of this new tape release, and will be soon adding the complete audio, finding aids, and analysis. The following are some excerpts from the newly released tapes from April to July 1973. Also of interest may be the President's Daily Diary, for: April 1-30, 1973 (pdf, 6.3m) May 1-31, 1973 (pdf, 7.7m) June 1-30, 1973 (pdf, 7.0m) July 1-31, 1973 (pdf, 4.7m) Sample Excerpt #1: June 4, 1973, White House Telephone 039-087, 11:16 - 11:22 pm Kissinger conveyed the message that President Nixon had been invited to visit China again, following his first visit during February 1972. Nixon also extended an invitation to Chinese Premier Chou En-lai to visit either Washington or New York, the site of the UN. Nixon was concerned about whether he should visit China again before a Chinese visit to the U.S. (The first high level visit from the PRC did not come until 1979, with the visit of Deng Xiaoping.) To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 11.4m, 5:56). Nixon: With regard to Mao, you know, that is quite significant, don't you think? Kissinger: Oh, I think that's of enormous significant, Mr. President. Nixon: The other thing I was going to say, though, that— Kissinger: Because it means that they think that they are going to deal with you for the foreseeable future. Nixon: Right. The other thing is do you think that we should get in—well we can't do it before you leave—but if you could get a message to the Ambassador here that we think it's very important for Chou En-lai to come to the UN. Or do you want to wait till August to do that? Kissinger: I've already done that, Mr. President. Nixon: You have? Kissinger: I did that— Nixon: You see— Kissinger: I took the liberty of doing that in response— Nixon: You see, it's going to look rather strange if I go running to China if he doesn't come here. Kissinger: No, I've already done that. Nixon: How'd you do it? Kissinger: I had already extended an invitation at your suggestion a few months ago. Nixon: Yeah, I know, but recently? Kissinger: I repeated it and I said we can do it in one of two ways: either to go to the UN, or better yet just come to Washington on a personal visit. Nixon: No, what he should do is come to the UN and then drop down here and we'll give him a nice dinner, you know, without the head of state thing, but it will be everything except the drill. Kissinger: Right. Well, I told him we could handle it either way. And— Nixon: And he's going to forward that to them, huh? Kissinger: And he said—well, he didn't turn it down. You know, in the past they could never do it as long as the ROC was— Nixon: Yeah, I know. I know. Yeah. Kissinger: He said, well he's very busy and he'll look at his calendar. Nixon: Well in view of the Mao thing, you see, the Mao thing has to be significant, because if it came from Chou En-lai that would be one thing, but coming from Mao— Kissinger: It came from both. It was a joint invitation. Nixon: Right. Kissinger: And I don't know whether you noticed, Mr. President, when he came that he said to you, "Mr. and Mrs. Mao." Nixon: Yeah! Yeah, I know. Kissinger: Well, that was very significant considering her role in the Cultural Revolution. Nixon: Yeah, and as a member of the Central Committee. Kissinger: Yes, and of the Politburo. Nixon: Politburo, I meant. Yeah. Yeah. Kissinger: So I thought it was an extremely significant event. Nixon: Yeah. Kissinger: And also that they answered you within three days. I mean, you only saw him last Wednesday. Nixon: Right. Right. Kissinger: And they also gave us a rather good message on Cambodia. Nixon: Oh, did they? Kissinger: Yes, but we musn't refer to it in any sense. Nixon: Oh, no, no, no. Because they can't get caught at it, I know. Sample Excerpt #2: May 8, 1973, Oval Office 912-015, 12:34 - 12:56 pm In a twist on ping-ping diplomacy, Brazilian soccer great Pele visited President Nixon for an exchange of greetings and gifts. Pele discussed the sport's rising popularity in the United States, and Nixon responded that the greatest American players were at Howard University in Washington, D.C. Pele discussed his interest in forming cultural exchanges between Latin America and the United States. To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 10.3m, 5:23). Nixon: You are the greatest in the world. Pele: [Handed Nixon a clipping from Sao Paolo while photographers take photos.] Nixon: Do you speak any Spanish? Pele: No, Portuguese. It is all the same. Nixon: He always wins. Mrs. do Nacimento: Yes. Nixon: The national champions of soccer in the United States are here in Washington, at Howard University. Here is a clipping of my visit with Pele to Sao Paolo in 1967. Pele: Soccer is very different from American football. Nixon: Do I know that! The main thing is to use your head. Pele: Here is a film of soccer which I would like to present. I know you are busy. Nixon: Sports films I watch. Pele: It shows the world-wide soccer and the training that is required. Nixon: You have no sons, but maybe your grandsons will want to learn from it. [Nixon handed out pens.] Pele: Soccer is played more and more around the world and in the United States. My aim is to send soccer technicians to the U.S. and have your basketball technicians come to Latin America. Nixon: That is a great enterprise and I wish you well. Sample Excerpt #3: May 3, 1973, Oval Office 911-009, 9:48 - 10:12 am President Nixon met with Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, the Chief-Designate of the U.S. Liaison Office in Peking (the precursor to the American Embassy, which came into operation in 1979). Nixon asked Bruce to be active in Peking socially so that he could observe the next generation of political leaders likely to assume power from aging leaders Mao and Chou. Bruce, one of the 20th century's most experienced American diplomats, assured Nixon that he had experience with secret negotiations and is willing to keep his work secret from the State Department, which they both agreed had "non-existent" security. To listen to an audio excerpt, click here (mp3, 45.1m, 24:36). Nixon: Well, the great thing for you, as you know, substantively, probably not a great deal will happen for a while. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: But the most important thing about this is the symbolism. I mean, symbolism sometimes is not important, but now it is enormously important. Bruce: The fact that— Nixon: The fact that you are there. Let me tell you one thing I particularly would like to see. I know that the social world is a total pain in the [neck], but to the extent that you can, if you could get around, and have your colleagues get around and give us an evaluation of the people on the way up who are there now. Bruce: Yes. Yes. Nixon: You've got to understand, Mao will soon be leaving; Chou En-Lai is in his 70s but he's as vigorous as can be—terrific. You're really going to like him, you'll like them both. Chou En-lai is an amazing man. But on the other hand, except for some men in their 30s—late 30s and 40s—I don't see much coming up. And I think, you know, you can do that. Look around, see who the power is. That's the one thing that would be very important for us to know. Isn't it? Bruce: Well, I think it is, yes. Because if they have sort of a collegial [unclear]— Nixon: The Russians have quite a few in their shop that you know might come along. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: And you know, an interesting thing, the Russians too [unclear], so pretty soon we know in four or five years there's going to be change there. But there will be a change in China. And the world changes. Well, there's that. Then, of course, the just, you know, your sense of the country, its people. I mean, I'm really, really more interested in that than I am in the routine cables, "Well, today we did this, or that, or the other thing. We signed an agreement." You know, this is how we grow figs. Bruce: Exactly. Nixon: Huh? Bruce: Yes. Nixon: Don't you agree? Bruce: I do agree. Nixon: We're trying to see what this great—I mean, we've got to get along with this one-fourth of all people in the world. The ablest people in the world in my opinion—potentially. We've got to get along with them. It's no problem for the next 5 years, the next 20 years, but it's the critical problem of our age. Bruce: Yes, I think it is. Nixon: The other thing is, if you could, constantly of course, whenever you're talking, they're very subtle—and they're not like the Russians, who, of course slobber at flattery and all that sort of thing. But you should let them know how—two things: one, from a personal standpoint how much I appreciated the welcome while we were there. Second, we look forward to, some time, returning. Third, I would very much hope that Chou En-lai will see his way clear to come here to the UN. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: Or something. I'd like to take him here, and it can be worked out in proper way. And fourth, and I think this is the most important, that I look upon the Chinese-American relationship as really the key to peace in the world. Always have in the back of your mind without playing it too obviously, the fact that the only thing that makes the Russian game go is the Chinese game. Always have in the back of your mind that if you say anything pro-Russian, [unclear]. Always have in the back of your mind that the Russians are their deadly enemies. And they know it, and we know it. And that we will stand by them. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: And that's the commitment that I have made. I have. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: How we do it, I don't know. But that's what keeps. Because David, what is probably in our time maybe that big collision could occur, and collisions even between enemies these days will involve all nations of the world, they're that big. So we want to avoid that, too. But my point is the Chinese must be assured they have one heck of a friend here. They hate the Indians, as you know. Bruce: Yes. Nixon: Well, they don't hate them as much as they have contempt for them. They think that India is becoming a, you know, a sort of satellite of Russia. And of course the Japanese, they have a fear and respect for them as well. So with the Japanese, sort of say the right thing in terms of we want to get along with Japan and the rest. And it's very important that we have our, that we maintain our, in other words the shield there, because otherwise Japan goes into business for itself and that's not in our interest. And the other point that they're fairly interested in, looking at the world scene, another point, apart from the fact they'll go through the usual jazz [unclear] keeping revolutions in mind. That's fine. What they do in Africa I don't care anymore. But Europe. They don't want us to get out of Europe. Because they realize as long as the Russians have a tie down in Europe, that—you see what I mean? Bruce: Oh, I do. Nixon: So some of our well-intentioned Congressmen go over there and reassure them, "Oh, look, we're going to get out of Asia. We're going to get out of Japan, we're trying to reduce our forces in Europe." Well, that for the Chinese scares them to death. Bruce: Well, I was struck by the conversations that you've had, and how they came back to the necessity about preserving forces in Europe. They were very pro-NATO for their own reasons. It was interesting. Nixon: Absolutely. Bruce: Well, I've got all those points in mind. Those conversations that you had there I've read. I must say they really are quite [unclear] fascinating to read. Nixon: Yeah. You're one of the few in the country who's read them. Bruce: I'd forgotten—but I do think they're absolutely fascinating. Nixon: Yeah. A lot of history was made there. Bruce: It was indeed. I think probably the most significant history, diplomatic history, of our time. No question about it. And I don't see anything, which could really ruin it in the time being. Without any hesitation I can tell you I always thought the preservation of good relations should have sort of ordinary courtesies and what not in the beginning, it'll probably be all business, but you try and get to know as many people as possible. [unclear] Nixon: Let them think that we are strong, respected, and we're not going to be pushed around by the Russians or anybody else. Middle East—we have no answer there, as you know. Bruce: I know. Nixon: They haven't either. But I think the great irony is that today the United States of all nations is China's most important friend. [laughter] Romania? Tanzania? Albania? [unclear] Bruce: That's pretty good stuff. Nixon: My point is, with that in mind—would you like a little coffee? Bruce: No, I wouldn't like some. I just had some. Nixon: Oh, fine. I'll have a little, just a cup. Bruce: But this is the most fascinating development, I think. Nixon: It sure is. Bruce: We must replace the policies that have become so embedded almost in the American consciousness that nobody in particular complained about it, and nobody intended [unclear]. Nixon: Look, for 20 years, do you know, we were sort of—now look, I'm supposed to be the number one Red-baiter in the country. I have earned that reputation for what you know very well. Had we just continued the policy of just a silent confrontation and almost non-communication with the PRC— Bruce: Yes. Nixon: In the end we would reap a nuclear war. No question. Bruce: Yes. Yes. Nixon: We just had to breakthrough. Bruce: Yeah. Nixon: Also, as I said, it was so important to the Russian game. Bruce: Terribly important. Nixon: Yeah. Bruce: Terribly important. Nixon: Yeah. Bruce: It must have [unclear]. How about does one explain to the Chinese that we want to preserve a relationship that has great importance to us, a meaningful relationship with Russia? The Chinese are undoubtedly our favorites between the two. But— Nixon: The Russians are saying: Now look, this is very important. That Nixon is having another meeting with Brezhnev. There's going to be a lot of reasons for having that meeting. The important thing there to remember is that Russia and the United States are superpowers. That our interests do rub together in the Mideast and in Europe, particularly. That their rubbing together is a danger that is almost unbelievably great, and that under these circumstances we feel what we have to do is try to limit that danger as much as we can through communication. But, on the other hand, we do not consider putting it quite bluntly as betw… truncated (25,744 more characters in archive)