Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria | Crisis Group Skip to main content About Us Who We Are How We Work Our Impact Financials Support Us Careers CrisisWatch Events Upcoming Events Event Recordings Multimedia Podcasts Afrique 360 Hold Your Fire Ripple Effect The Horn War & Peace Video Photography Contact Us Contacts For Journalists Donate Subscribe Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria Share Facebook Twitter Email Save MORE Print Download Full Report View Maps العربية English العربية Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria Table of Contents Executive SummaryIntroductionCountering ISIS in the BadiaISIS’s Resurgence (2019-2021)Insufficient ResponseThe Regime Pushes BackCountering ISIS in the North EastA Resilient InsurgencyContested controlEconomic and governance declineISIS’s Shifting StrategyAn insurgency of cellsA regional division of labourA diversity of incomeA lack of strong institutionsA prison attackLooking AheadConclusionAppendix A About Us CrisisWatch Events Multimedia Contact Us Latest Updates Regional Programs Gender & Conflict Future of Conflict Global Issues Visual Explainers Back to Main Menu Africa Asia Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa United States Back to Main Menu Future of Conflict Climate, Environment and Conflict Economics of Conflict Future of Conflict Technology and War Back to Main Menu Global Issues Eastern Mediterranean Rivalries From Early Warning to Early Action Humanitarian Fallout of Conflict Jihad in Modern Conflict Multilateral Diplomacy Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Back to Main Menu Visual Explainers Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2024 Against Seeming Odds, Assistance Comes to Derna Which conflicts should the UNGA look at? 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U.S. Sanctions, Peacemaking and Reform The U.S. Containment Strategy in Somalia Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2023 Giving Countries in Conflict Their Fair Share of Climate Finance Floods, Displacement and Violence in South Sudan Rough Seas: Tracking Maritime Tensions with Iran Crime in Pieces: The Effects of Mexico’s “War on Drugs”, Explained How Yemen’s War Economy Undermines Peace Efforts Ten Conflicts to Watch in 2022 How Climate Change Fuels Deadly Conflict The Climate Factor in Nigeria’s Farmer-Herder Violence The Iran-U.S./Israel Trigger List Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas: A Visual Explainer The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer Turkey’s PKK Conflict: A Visual Explainer Members of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) deploy outside Ghwayran prison in Syria's northeastern city of Hasakeh, after having retaken the facility following its takeover by Islamic State (IS) group forces. January 26, 2022. AFP Report 236 / Middle East & North Africa 18 July 2022 20+ minutes Containing a Resilient ISIS in Central and North-eastern Syria Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another. Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Full Report Also available in العربية English العربية Related Tags Jihad in Modern Conflict Syria What’s new? ISIS is waging a resilient insurgency throughout central and north-eastern Syria. It treats these two quasi-independent zones as interconnected theatres, giving it flexibility in its strategy for reasserting territorial control. The myriad forces battling the group, meanwhile, often work at cross-purposes. Why does it matter? Counter-ISIS campaigns have made significant yet inconclusive gains. In particular, they have done little to stop fighters from crossing the lines of control in Syria. The longer this situation persists, the deeper the militants can sink their roots and the harder they will be to beat. What should be done? First and foremost, those fighting ISIS should avoid escalation among themselves that would give the group more breathing room. Each actor should also work to limit the militants’ freedom of movement between theatres, primarily by closing off smuggling routes. Executive Summary ISIS – the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – has shown considerable resilience since March 2019, when it lost the last piece of territory it held in Syria and Iraq. It has maintained, and in some cases expanded, a robust insurgency in four parts of Syria, each held by a different set of Syrian forces, three of which have foreign backers. Its adversaries, who are often at odds with one another, have siloed their counter-ISIS efforts and done little to stop the movement of militants across the permeable lines of control. ISIS is exploiting this disorder to bolster its fighting capacity. Policymakers on the various sides conducting counter-ISIS operations appear to be a long way from forging a détente, but they should nonetheless strive to avoid new conflict among themselves, which could only serve ISIS. They should ensure that their strategies account for developments in regions outside their control. They should also crack down on the smuggling routes that ISIS uses to transport fighters and supplies from one theatre to another. The Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate came to an end with its defeat in the Syrian town of Baghouz near the Iraqi border. Since then, a multitude of parties have taken over the land that once made up its domain: the Iraqi army and Popular Mobilisation (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) paramilitary groups in Iraq; the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in north-eastern Syria (the U.S. also continues to launch airstrikes on ISIS targets in other parts of the country); Türkiye and its Syrian partners in northern Aleppo; the Islamist group Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib; and the Damascus regime and its Russian and Iranian allies in the central Syrian desert known as the Badia. Today, ISIS leaders appear mostly to be providing broad guidance through online messaging rather than exercising day-to-day command over all the group’s members and sympathisers in Syria. The group now seems to operate on two levels: a core of militants acting on the leadership’s directives conducts complex attacks, while a second, larger set of decentralised cells carries out smaller, more frequent raids, intimidates the public and handles the money. In this manner, ISIS has entrenched communication and transit networks linking the country’s various regions, assigning its cells specific roles in each place and viewing its activities in each area as enhancing those in the others. ISIS is readying itself to pursue the goal of regaining overt territorial control if and when circumstances allow. In central and north-eastern Syria [ISIS] moves men and materiel between regime- and Syrian Democratic Forces-controlled regions. ISIS uses each of its four zones of influence in Syria in a distinct way. In the Badia, the rear base for its operations in Syria, as well as Iraq, it also trains most of its new recruits. In the north east, it gathers funds and stores supplies, as it stages attacks on security forces, technocrats and tribal notables to weaken public confidence in local governance. In the north and north west, it maintains hideouts for mid-level and senior commanders, who enjoy a degree of anonymity among the hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians living in makeshift settlements. The ISIS insurgencies in central and north-eastern Syria are particularly intertwined. The group moves men and materiel between regime- and SDF-controlled regions depending on its changing objectives, its logistical needs and its foes’ vulnerabilities in each area. These movements appear to be coordinated among central, regional and sub-regional commanders. The ceasefires that froze Syria’s front lines in 2020 allowed Damascus and its external backers to redeploy troops to fight ISIS in the centre and east. This effort led to a drop in ISIS attacks on regime targets throughout 2021. Some ISIS fighters withdrew to even more remote parts of central Syria to avoid interdiction, while many others moved into Iraq or north-eastern Syria. This second cohort of fighters appears to have bolstered the cells in the latter areas, enabling ISIS to carry out more operations, including the spectacular January 2022 assault on the SDF-run prison in Hasakeh holding ISIS fighters and adolescent boys from Syria and Iraq, as well as third countries. Omens of a large-scale ISIS attack had been visible for some time. Throughout much of 2020 and 2021, ISIS cells had been lying low in the north east, building an intelligence network, raising money through theft, extortion and smuggling, and degrading the SDF’s capacity to gather intelligence and provide services through its Autonomous Administration. The cells picked up the pace of their efforts in mid-2021, as their revenues grew. SDF-held Syria is particularly vulnerable to a resurgent ISIS. The SDF, despite its earlier strides in battling the group, faces myriad problems that could derail counter-ISIS efforts and hamper its ability to guard the thousands of militants, as well as affiliated women, whom it holds in camps along with their children. ISIS cells are assassinating local SDF commanders and tribal notables, sowing fear in order to heighten their sway over people in areas the group previously controlled. In particular, the cells’ growing reach in Deir al-Zor has frightened residents, thwarting the SDF and U.S.-led coalition in efforts to collect intelligence. The SDF’s willingness and ability to counter ISIS is contingent on continued U.S. military support, and perhaps also lowered Turkish and regime threats to its rule. Despite this unstable situation, those fighting ISIS can still prevent the group from resurging. Primarily, they will need to forgo conflict among themselves that could give ISIS a new lease on life. But they can do more than that. In the north east, U.S.-led coalition members should expand their political and economic support, particularly where residents are at high risk of ISIS recruitment, such as Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, and increase material aid for and training of security forces. They should simultaneously push for reforms to policies in Arab-majority areas that have generated grievances of which ISIS takes advantage. With the U.S.-led coalition’s help, the SDF should also clamp down on corruption and smuggling. Damascus and Moscow should likewise secure the lines of control in the Badia, as a stronger ISIS in the north east could soon try to bolster cells in the central desert with new recruits and supplies. The Badia’s oil and gas fields would be vulnerable to attack if ISIS were to return in significant numbers. The regime and its external backers should keep taking the fight to ISIS in central Syria. The group is unlikely to again pose the global menace it did when it ruled its caliphate some years ago. But in the right conditions, it could take advantage of the discord or distraction among its enemies to expand its military and financial reach and add misery to the lives of Syrians and Iraqis in areas where it operates. Deir al-Zor/Hasakeh/Washington/Brussels, 18 July 2022 Map of Central and Northeast Syria, June 2022. Borders, roads, and water from Humanitarian Data Exchange (HDX); control areas adapted from @Suriyakmaps; oil, gas and infrastructure from Crisis Group database. I. Introduction Since its territorial defeat in central Syria in 2017 and in north-eastern Syria and northern Iraq in 2019, the Islamic State has waged a sophisticated insurgent campaign spread thinly across these regions of the two countries. The various actors controlling these areas rarely cooperate in their counter-ISIS efforts and in fact often work against one another, to the militant group’s benefit.[fn]Syria is divided into four de facto areas of control. The regime and its external backers rule almost 65 per cent of the country, including the south, the centre and the two biggest cities, Aleppo and Damascus. The Kurdish-led SDF controls the north east, the Islamist militant group Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) administers Idlib province in the north west and Turkish-backed Syrian rebels run Afrin, northern Aleppo governorate and a strip of land along the Turkish border extending from Tel Abyad to Ras al-Ain.Hide Footnote ISIS, by contrast, treats these border-spanning zones as interconnected theatres, creating a significant degree of flexibility in its strategy for reasserting its dominance there.[fn]In addition to operations in central, north-eastern and north-western Syria, ISIS has occasionally claimed attacks in Daraa and Quneitra governorates in the south. Such claims are rare, however, and it is unclear to what extent these cells are tied to the ISIS network in Syria. They may instead be remnants of a historically isolated ISIS affiliate that controlled parts of the Yarmouk river basin at the intersection of the Syrian, Israeli and Jordanian borders. Crisis Group telephone interviews, Daraa-based researchers, June 2021; Crisis Group interviews, U.S. military and security officials, Hasakeh, May 2021.Hide Footnote Damascus, whose top priority has always been its fight with anti-regime rebels, did not launch a major counter-ISIS campaign until May 2017, once it had recaptured the country’s largest city, Aleppo, from the rebels and semi-frozen the front lines in that battle. Together with Russia and Iran, the regime went after ISIS on three fronts over the course of that month, b… truncated (110,067 more characters in archive)