CAIN: Events: Bloody Sunday: British Irish Rights Watch Submission to the United Nations, 1994
CAIN: Events: Bloody Sunday: British Irish Rights Watch Submission to the United Nations, 1994 CAIN Web Service 'Bloody Sunday' - Submission to the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions [CAIN_Home] [KEY_EVENTS] [Key_Issues] [Conflict_Background] 'BLOODY SUNDAY': [Menu] [Reading] [Summary] [Chronology] [Dead] [Circumstances] [Background] [Events] [Photographs] [Sources] Text: British Irish Rights Watch ... Page Compiled: Fionnuala McKenna Material is added to this site on a regular basis - information on this page may change The following report has been contributed by the British Irish Rights Watch. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the CAIN Project. The CAIN Project would welcome other material which meets our guidelines for contributions. BLOODY SUNDAY Submission to the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions: The Murder of 13 Civilians by Soldiers of the British Army on 'Bloody Sunday', 30th January 1972 Published (1994) by: British Irish Rights Watch Web Site First Floor, 20-21 Took's Court Cursitor Street London EC4A 1LB This chapter is copyright British Irish Rights Watch and is included on the CAIN site by permission of the author and publisher. You may not edit, adapt, or redistribute changed versions of this for other than your personal use without the express written permission of the author and publisher, British Irish Rights Watch. Redistribution for commercial purposes is not permitted. SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON SUMMARY AND ARBITRARY EXECUTIONS: THE MURDER OF 13 CIVILIANS BY SOLDIERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY ON 'BLOODY SUNDAY', 30TH JANUARY 1972 CONTENTS 1: INTRODUCTION 2: BACKGROUND TO BLOODY SUNDAY 3: THE PLAN FOR POLICING THE DEMONSTRATION 4: WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 5: OFFICIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE INCIDENT 6: THE DECEASED 7: THE WOUNDED 8: THE WIDGERY TRIBUNAL 9: OTHER INQUIRIES INTO BLOODY SUNDAY 10: CONCLUSION 1.INTRODUCTION 1.1 This submission seeks the assistance of the Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions in relation to the deaths on 30.1 .1972 (Bloody Sunday) of 13 civilians, killed by the British army. 13 others were injured. 1.2 We believe that these deaths come within the remit of the Special Rapporteur because they involved: "The deprivation of life of civilians by members of the armed or security forces in violation of law governing the state of war or armed conflict" and because they were deaths which took place: "As a result of abuse of force by police, military or any other governmental or quasi-governmental forces". [United Nations Factsheet No. 11 on Summary or Arbitrary Executions] 1.3 We submit that these deaths were a violation of the deceased's right to life under Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and under Article 6 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 1.4 The 13 people who died on Bloody Sunday were taking part in an illegal demonstration against internment without trial. A crack battalion of the British Army, the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (the Paras), reputed to be the toughest regiment in the army, was deployed to mount an arrest operation within the Bogside area of city of Derry, which had been a nationalist "no go area" for British troops for the previous two years. The Paras opened fire on the demonstrators, a small number of whom had previously been engaged in low-level rioting, such as stoning soldiers. Accounts differ as to whether the soldiers were fired upon before opening fire or whether they fired without provocation, but it is undisputed that army statements issued after the incident claiming that the deceased were gunmen and bombers were untrue. There is no evidence that any of the deceased was engaged in attacking soldiers at the time of their deaths; on the contrary most of them were fleeing from the soldiers. No soldier was prosecuted for any of the killings. The British government ordered an immediate judicial inquiry into the incident, undertaken by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Widgery [appended at Annex A]. His report, published in April 1972 less than three months after the event, has been criticised and discredited in a number of important respects. So far, pleas from the relatives of the deceased for a new inquiry to establish the true facts and to properly exonerate the reputations of the deceased have been denied by the British government. 1.5 These matters are described and substantiated in more detail below. 2.BACKGROUND TO BLOODY SUNDAY 2.1 Northern Ireland is in the grip of a savage sectarian conflict, euphemistically described as "the Troubles", which has its origins in the British invasion and subjugation of Ireland in Tudor times and the partition of Ireland in 1921, but which has intensified since 1968, claiming over 3,100 lives in the past 25 years. The conflict exists between nationalists, who want to see a united Ireland and who are predominantly Catholic by religion, and unionists, who want Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom and who are predominantly Protestants. Nationalists who support the use of violence to achieve their ends are known as republicans, and unionists who do so are known as loyalists, although not all those who would describe themselves as republicans or loyalists support political violence. The British army has been deployed continuously in Northern Ireland since 1969. The British Government claims that there has been a public emergency relating to Northern Ireland because of the conflict since 1974 [Fourth Report of the Special Rapporteur on States of Emergency, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/28/ Rev.1, 21.11.1991]; it had not made any such claim at the time of Bloody Sunday. 2.2On 9th August 1971, the unionist government of Northern Ireland (known as the Stormont government), with the support of the British government, introduced internment without trial. By the end of 1971 around 900 people, virtually all of them nationalists, were imprisoned, in violation of international norms on the right to a fair trial. At the same time that internment was introduced, a six month ban on public demonstrations was imposed under emergency legislation in force at the time. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), formed in 1967 to combat the widespread political and social discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland which is one of the roots of the conflict, called a demonstration in Derry for Sunday 30th January 1972, as much in protest against the ban on the right to demonstrate as a protest against internment itself. 2.3 The city of Derry (officially known as Londonderry) is situated on the north-western border of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland. At the time of Bloody Sunday, it had a population of around 55,000, about 33,000 of whom lived in the predominantly Catholic districts of Creggan and the Bogside. The Bogside had been a republican no-go area for about two years, which meant that the Irish Republican Army (IRA), rather than the police or the army, had effective control of the district. The British security forces were naturally dissatisfied with this situation and were looking for an opportunity to carry out the orders of the Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland, General Ford, issued on 26.10.1971 to Brigadier MacLellan, commander 8 Infantry Brigade, who had overall command of the troops on Bloody Sunday, "so far as possible, to recreate the state of law in the Creggan and Bogside as and when he could." [Insight, Times, 23.4.1972]. 2.4 A week before the Bloody Sunday demonstration, a smaller anti-internment demonstration had been held outside the internment camp at Magilligan, not far from Derry. This demonstration had been broken up with extreme violence by about 300 soldiers. NICRA were anxious to avoid a repetition, and placed "special emphasis on the necessity for a peaceful incident-free day" on 30th January [Irish News, 28.1.1972]. According to Ivan Cooper, a Member of Parliament at the time and one of the organisers of the march, assurances had been obtained from the IRA that it would withdraw from the area during the demonstration [Secret History: Bloody Sunday, broadcast by Channel 4 television on 22.1.1992]. The IRA confirmed that this was the case to the Insight team of reporters who published their own analysis of Bloody Sunday in the Sunday Times on 23.4.1972 [Annex B]. 2.5 On 27.1.1972 the Democratic Unionist Association in Derry, in an act of provocation aimed at both nationalists and the Stormont government, announced that they intended to hold a public religious rally in the Guildhall Square, the intended termination point of the NICRA march, on Sunday 30th January. Their Vice-President, the Rev. James McClelland, was reported in the Irish Press on 28.1.1972 as saying, 'The civil rights march is not legal. Theirs [the DUAs], he said, would be. The authorities will have to keep their word and stop the civil rights march and give us protection." On Sunday 30th, several newspapers announced that the religious rally had been called off. The Sunday Post reported McClelland as saying on the previous day, "We were approached by the Government and given assurances that the Civil Rights march would be halted - by force if necessary. We believe wholesale riot and bloodshed could be the result of the Civil Rights activities tomorrow and we would be held responsible if our rally takes place. We have appealed to all loyalists to stay out of the city centre tomorrow." 2.6 Thus the demonstration on Bloody Sunday took place against a background of high political tension and in an atmosphere of the apprehension of violence, which would have been as apparent to the security forces as it was to everyone else involved. 3. THE PLAN FOR POLICING THE DEMONSTRATION 3.1 According to Lord Widgerys report [paragraphs 16 - 23], on 25.1 .1972 General Ford, the Commander Land Forces in Northern Ireland, put Brigadier Andrew MacLellan, commander of 8 Infantry Brigade, in charge of the operation to contain the march. He prepared Operation Order No. 2/72, dated 27.1.1972. This provided for the erection of 26 barriers, designed to cordon the Creggan and Bogside off from the rest of the city, each of which was to be manned by a platoon from the Brigade and a token police presence. If rioting broke out, water cannon and rubber bullets were to be used if necessary and CS gas as a last resort. "Hooligans and rioters" were to be arrested by a central arrest force, furnished by the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 Para). 3.2 On 24.1.1972 Chief Superintendent Frank Lagan of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (the police force) told MacLellan that he was of the opinion that the only way to avoid serious violence was to let the march proceed, but that the marchers should be photographed with a view to prosecuting them later for defying the ban on demonstrations and/or for rioting. MacLellan agreed to recommend this approach to General Ford. However, on the same day Ford had sent orders to Lieutenant Colonel Derek Wilford, commander of 1 Para, to prepare for service in Derry on 30.1.1972, and it would appear from the terms of the Operation Order that it was decided to make arrests on the day itself. The Insight team alleged that the plan was approved by the Northern Ireland Committee of the Cabinet (the executive of the British government) because it carried the obvious risk of casualties. On 19.4.1972 the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, confirmed that the plan was 'known to [government] Ministers" [Hansard, col. 523]. 3.3 The arrest operation was carried out by Support Company of 1 Para, under the command of Major Ted Loden. Support Company was the only company to fire live ammunition on Bloody Sunday [Widgery, paragraph 26] and was thus responsible for all the deaths and injuries that occurred. The Insight team say that Wilford drew up an operational plan for the arrest operation which Loden declared unworkable only 2 hours before the demonstration was due to begin. As a result, 1 Para was deployed through the barricade on Little James Street, which had the effect of driving the demonstrators down Rossville Street, despite the fact that the Operational Order said, "(c) The scoop up [arrest] operation is likely to be launched on two axes, one directed towards hooligan activity in the area of William St/Little Diamond and one towards the area of William St/Little James St." It was because of the confined location defined by the Order that when Wilford requested permission from MacLellan to deploy his troops, he was ordered, "Not to conduct running battle down Rossville Street" [official Brigade Log, quoted at Widgery paragraph 29, emphasis from original]. According to Insight, Wilford did not tell Loden, when he briefed him, of "the geographically limited operation which MacLellan had carefully defined." 3.4 Wilford himself, speaking on the BBC television documentary, Inside Story: Remember Bloody Sunday, broadcast on 28.1.1992, said of his own orders: "I asked...the question which in fact for a long time has...worried me. I said, 'What happens if there is shooting?' To which I got really a very...sparse reply to the effect that, 'Oh well, well deal with that when it comes.' It's my greatest regret that I didn't actually pursue that question and say, 'Right you know what - what do you want us to do if we're shot at?"' Soldiers in Support Company, however, were briefed to expect to be shot at. The Company Sergeant Major, interviewed for the same programme, said, "I did expect when we went into the Rossville flats to be fired at." The Platoon Sergeant said, "I was just told that there was a possibility that gunmen would be in the area and to keep our eyes out especially for high ground like the Rossville flats - obvious sniper position." 3.5 Lord Widgery said of 1 Para's attitude to the use of lethal force [paragraph 94], "In the Parachute Regiment, at any rate in the 1st Battalion, the soldiers are trained to take what may be described as a bard line upon these questions. The events of 30 January and the attitude of individual soldiers whilst giving evidence suggest that when engaging an identified gunman or bomb-thrower they shoot to kill and continue to fire until the target disappears or falls. When under attack and returning fire they show no particular concern for the safety of others in the vicinity of the target. They are aware that civilians who do not wish to be associated with violence tend to make themselves scarce at the first alarm and they know that it is the deliberate policy of gunmen to use civilians as cover. Further, when hostile firing is taking place the soldiers of 1 Para will fire on a person who appears to be using a firearm against them without always waiting until they can positively identify the weapon. Wilford, interviewed on Remember Bloody Sunday, put it more succinctly, "When we moved on the streets we moved as if we in fact were moving against a well-armed well-trained army. 4. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 4.1 The march passed off peacefully, as the organisers had intended, until it reached the junction of William Street and Rossville Street, where the lorry at the head of the march turned right up Rossville Street, leading the marchers away from any confrontation with soldiers at the barrier in William Street. However, about 200 marchers, most of them young men, broke away from the march and began throwing stones at the soldiers on the barricade. The soldiers responded with rubber bullets and water cannon, and these rioters were effectively repelled. It was at this point that 1 Para requested permission to commence its arrest, or scoop up" operation. According to the official Brigade Log, one sub unit was ordered forward at 1 6.07 hours. Three minutes later, at 16.10, Support Company began firing. Under30 minutes later, 13 civilians were dead and another 1 3 lay injured. 4.2 The facts set out above are generally agreed to be correct by all concerned. Virtually all other significant matters of fact are disputed and are the subject of conflicting evidence. Even the number of people taking part in the demonstration is contested: Lord Widgery [paragraph 24] said that there were between 3,000 and 5,000; according to the Insight team, the organisers claimed there were 30,000; Bernadette Devlin MP, a speaker at the demonstration, said in Parliament that there were at least 15,000 [Hansard, 1.2.1972, col. 293]. 4.3 Much controversy surrounds the question of who precisely sanctioned Support Company's opening fire upon the demonstrators. According to Widgery [paragraphs 27 - 29], the order to commence the arrest operation came from MacLellan and was given to Wilford over a secure wireless link, as a result of which it was not recorded in the verbatim record of the ordinary brigade radio network. However, the official Brigade Log does not record the order either, but only a limited authorisation to deploy a sub unit, no mention being made of Support Company. Furthermore, a tape recording of the actual messages relayed over the ordinary radio network was produced in evidence at the Widgery inquiry which is at odds with the official log, in that the log records permission for the sub unit to carry out the scoop up operation, but the tape does not; its absence was explained by the Brigade Major as resulting from the fact that this order was also given over the secure link, but this does not explain why one such order appears in the log but the other does not. [For a fuller explanation of these matters, please see Justice Denied: A Challenge to Lord Widgery's Report on 'Bloody Sunday', International League for the Rights of Man, pages 18- 23, at Annex C.] However, MacLellan, his Brigade Major, and Wilford all gave Widgery sworn testimony that MacLellan gave the order, and Widgery accepted their evidence. Chief Superintendent Lagan of the RUC, though, told Widgery that he had formed the impression that 1 Para went ahead without authority from MacLellan. Insight, on the other hand, allege that, in the heat of the moment, with the geographically confined original plan in tatters, it was really Loden who was in charge of the troops during the crucial 35 minutes when all the shooting took place, and that MacLellan had no idea what Support Company was doing or even where it was. 1 Para's Company Sergeant Major told Remember Bloody Sunday that he clearly remembered the order from his company commander as being, "Move, move, move!" Brian Cashinella, Northern Ireland correspondent for the Times in 1972, told Secret History that as 1 Para came through the barricade, ". . . I was standing next to General Robert Ford at the time who was a new commander, and he was waving his swaggery stick saying, 'Go on the Paras, go and get them, go on, go and get them.' And then all was mayhem." 4.4 Equal controversy surrounds the question of whether the soldiers opened fire without justification, or whether they came under fire first. Lord Widgery attached very great importance to this issue, to the extent that it overshadowed any consideration of whether the level of lethal force applied by Support Company was justified, either generally or, especially, in each individual case where someone died or was injured. Widgery was faced with a direct conflict of evidence between soldiers who gave evidence at the inquiry, all of whom maintained that Support Company came under fire first and that they continued to experience heavy and sustained fire throughout the 30 crucial minutes, and all the evidence which he heard and statements which were made available to him (which ran into hundreds) from eyewitnesses who claimed that the Paras had opened fire without justification and that… truncated (80,002 more characters in archive)